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Abstract. This paper describes a qualitative study of practitioner perspectives on regulated 
water resources planning practice in England and Wales. The study focuses on strengths and 
weaknesses of existing practice and the case for change toward a risk-based approach 
informed by stochastic modelling assessments. In-depth, structured interviews were 
conducted to capture the views of planners, regulators and consultants closely involved in the 
planning process. We found broad agreement that the existing water availability assessment 
methods are fallible; they lack transparency, are often highly subjective, and may fail to 
adequately expose problems of resilience. Whilst most practitioners believe these issues 
warrant a more detailed examination of risk in the planning process, few believe there is a 
strong case for a fundamental shift toward risk-based planning informed by stochastic 
modelling assessments. The study identifies perceived business risks associated with change 
and exposes widespread scepticism of stochastic methods. 
Key words. Water resources; water supply; water supply and demand; water industry; 
simulation modelling; risk assessment; modelling; uncertainty analysis. 
Introduction 
Water resources planning practice in England and Wales has undergone significant change 
over the last 25 years. It has responded to the political, legislative and regulatory environment 
to become a formal, standardised process. It has amalgamated old and new concepts, and 
crystallised them in a consistent and clearly defined set of metrics and methods that form the 
building blocks of the Water Resources Management Plan (WRMP)—now a statutory 
reporting requirement for all water companies. Yet none of the methodological changes 
experienced since industry privatisation represent a fundamental shift away from classic 
design principles that have persisted for more than a century. Ever present features include: 
an assessment of water availability under a given set of conditions and assuming historical 
recorded inflows, which produces a deterministic metric of supply known internationally as 
“system yield” and today in England and Wales as “Deployable Output” (DO); the use of 
subjectively defined planning heuristics and engineering margins; and the communication of 
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the state of the system using deterministic terminology, such as “surplus” and “deficit”, 
which can also be quantified as the difference between yield and demand—the so-called 
“supply-demand balance.” 
Under these design principles, an impetus for investment is created if current or projected 
conditions open up a deficit between supply and demand. The aim is then to discover the 
least-cost combination of options to address the deficit over the planning horizon. This design 
paradigm is broadly known as “least cost capacity expansion” (Loucks et al., 2005). Its 
weaknesses from a technical decision making perspective, which have long been recognised 
and are well documented, derive from its deterministic outlook amidst hydrological 
uncertainty and other uncertainties, which limits prospects for weighing the costs of 
infrastructure development against the benefits in terms of reduced risk. Capacity expansion 
planning contrasts with “risk-based” forms of planning that integrate supply and demand in 
the modelling assessments, explore hydrological variability and uncertainty using 
stochastically-derived flows and extensive Monte-Carlo analysis of the system, and produce 
likelihood estimates for a range of undesirable drought-related hazards. 
A debate on whether to shift toward this form of planning has begun in England and Wales, 
where a number of recent academic papers have promoted new planning frameworks that 
purport to deal more effectively with uncertainty (e.g., Hall et al., 2012; Hall and Borgomeo, 
2013; Korteling et al., 2013; Matrosov et al., 2013). More generally, there is a view from 
academia and consulting firms that the climate change adaptation agenda demands a fresh 
approach for dealing with uncertainty in water resources planning practice (views elicited by 
CH2MHill on behalf of the Environment Agency, 2013). This contrasts with the more 
conservative ambitions of the water companies (same study), which, in general, seek changes 
that would simplify and clarify existing process. So far this discussion has suffered from a 
lack of well-evidenced, documented knowledge to explain why the opinions of academics 
and practitioners diverge so starkly. This study aims to address this knowledge gap by 
capturing practitioner perspectives on the role of modelling and analysis in water resources 
planning. It seeks to understand what practitioners want to achieve through their modelling 
assessments and to expose the relevant viewpoints to help guide future research and inform 
policy decisions on how to shape the WRMP guidelines for 2019 and beyond. 
Interview Approach 
The study targeted experienced practitioners with working knowledge of the water 
availability assessment methods prescribed by the WRMP guidelines (EA, 2012). Our focus 
on technical methodological aspects distinguishes the study from earlier research (e.g., 
Davies and Daykin, 2011) that elicited practitioner views on the more general and 
administrative aspects of the WRMP process. The study is also distinct from the “Manual of 
Source Yields” UK Water Industry Research (UKWIR) project and the aforementioned work 
examining the case for change in the planning guidelines (EA, 2013) because it seeks to 
  
explicate some of the underlying motives that shape practitioner opinions on planning 
methodology. 
The research sought to answer three questions: 
1. How do some of the accepted technical methodological weaknesses of DO 
assessments affect the ability of companies to plan effectively? 
2. Why might practitioners seek to uphold the conventional modes of planning? 
3. What institutional factors might hinder the prospects for a risk-based approach 
informed by stochastic modelling assessments? 
We interviewed fifteen practitioners across seven water companies, the Environment Agency, 
Ofwat and two consulting firms. The sampling of participants was non-random; practitioners 
were selected for interview based on their role, experience and level of involvement with 
recent regulated planning activities. A small number of participants were recommended by 
other interviewees as appropriately experienced to contribute to the study. The sample 
incorporated a mix of lead planners (e.g., Head of Water Resources, Supply-Demand 
Manager), modellers (e.g., Modelling Manager, Water Resources Analyst/Consultant) and 
regulators (e.g., national-level co-ordinator, Regional Officer). All prospective interviewees 
were approached via email. 
The interviews were conducted face-to-face, which allowed for the use of visual aids and 
sketches for explaining and discussing abstract ideas. The interviews were “in-depth,” 
comprising pre-determined open-ended questions (i.e., “Why…?” and “How…?” questions 
rather than questions that can be answered with yes or no) and impromptu follow-up 
questions designed to extract as much information as possible on each subject (Foddy, 1993). 
A structured script was followed to prevent the discussion from drifting and to allow for 
responses to be categorised and compared. We used hypothetical scenarios—presented using 
water resources system schematics and performance graphs—to develop shared 
understanding and ensure questions were understood as intended. The script also included 
prompt information, including quotations from industry reports and reasoned arguments; the 
intention was not to lead the participant but rather to evoke counter-arguments and opinions 
on contentious issues, specifically those relating to weaknesses in DO assessment 
methodology (the approach was to first establish whether the interviewee acknowledged the 
existence of a particular weakness and then to elicit views on how the issue might affect a 
company’s ability to plan effectively). A basic interview script was sent to participants in 
advance to give them the opportunity to understand the interview themes and raise any 
questions. All participants were advised that their answers would be reported in anonymous 
form, with the proviso that distinctions might be drawn between different groups of 
interviewed practitioners (i.e., regulators versus company planners). The typical interview 
lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. 
Results are reported in the following sections using non-quantified terms—one, a few, some, 
most, almost all, all, etc.—to deter the reader from inferring proportional industry-wide 
  
representation from the relatively small sample of participants. All participants are considered 
to be ‘practitioners.’ Company practitioners are termed ‘planners.’ Practitioners from the 
Environment Agency and Ofwat are termed ‘regulators.’ Practitioners from consulting firms 
are termed ‘consultants.’ 
Practitioner Perspectives 
Establishing weaknesses in DO assessment methodology 
Three separate hypothetical scenarios were presented to elicit views on some possible 
weaknesses in DO assessment methodology. The scenarios were fabricated, but had been set 
up using real reservoir inflow data and modelled using Aquator (Oxscisoft). The first scenario 
was designed to highlight a problem of capturing resilience using DO assessments. It featured 
two hypothetical single-reservoir Water Resource Zones (WRZs): one was in a state of DO 
deficit, but was supported by a desalination plant that would be able to supply a third of the 
demand if the reservoir failed; the other was in DO surplus, but was isolated such the zone 
would suffer total demand shortfall if the reservoir failed (i.e., the zone in deficit was more 
resilient than the zone in surplus). Participants were presented with supply-demand balances 
and supporting risk analyses describing the state of both systems. They were then asked in 
which of the two systems they would invest an arbitrary sum of money for alleviating risk, 
ignoring regulatory guidance (which would direct investment to address the DO deficit) and 
assuming only one system could be selected for improvement. Results are presented in Box 
1.Very few participants—and no company planners—argued that the system in deficit 
merited the investment. Roughly half of the participants reported that the system in surplus 
merited the investment, in most cases commenting that the consequences of failure in that 
system would be unacceptable. Most of the other participants reported that they would be 
uncomfortable reaching a decision without further information, particularly customer 
preferences. 
Box 1 
In which system would you invest—the system in deficit (incorporating desalination 
support) or the system in surplus (but isolated)? 
System in deficit System in surplus Unwilling to commit 
~ Half of the participants Very few Almost half 
The second scenario focused on the issue of subjectivity. The scenario showed how a 
reservoir system could shift from a state of significant DO surplus to significant DO deficit 
depending on the size of the Emergency Storage, which is influential if DO is constrained by 
critical drought failure. Participants were asked for their interpretation of the reasons behind 
industry rules for sizing and reporting of the Emergency Storage. Most participants 
commented that the Emergency Storage margin came out of the Government’s Agenda for 
  
Action (DoE, 1996) that followed the 1995/96 drought, but none knew why 30 days’ demand 
is the recommended volume. Some participants guessed that the assumption had been based 
on an assessment of the time required to either ensure supply into wetter autumn months or to 
implement contingency measures. Others believed the reasoning was more superficial: 30 
days is a “nice number,” equal to a calendar month. But most either gave no reason or stated 
explicitly that there is no logical reasoning behind the volume used. A few participants 
reported that Emergency Storage is too difficult an issue to tackle properly and, as such, it has 
never been challenged in a risk management context. Moreover, the majority of participants 
believed that the omission of Emergency Storage in guidelines and reporting requirements is 
an oversight—that the Emergency Storage “has slipped through the net”, is “lost in history”, 
and has been “buried in the analysis and forgotten about.” One planner described a “tick-box 
mentality” that has led regulators to overlook important details, including Emergency 
Storage. A few participants commented that such subjective assumptions lead to a weak 
understanding and prevent clear communication of risk to customers. 
A third scenario focused on comparability of DO assessments. The aim was to highlight how 
certain system characteristics (e.g., level of integration and source diversity) might prevent 
fair comparison of DO assessments across different zones. The scenario turned out to be 
superfluous because the idea that DO assessments cannot be fairly cross-compared across 
WRZs was already an accepted fact in nearly all of the participants’ minds. Most reported 
that fair DO cross-comparison was an unrealistic goal and that there are numerous causes of 
inconsistency across different WRZs, including emergency storage, source types and control 
curve positioning. 
Implications for effective planning 
The basic scenarios and subsequent discussions established wide practitioner agreement that 
DO assessments (1) may fail to capture problems of resilience, (2) are often influenced by 
highly subjective assumptions, and (3) cannot generally be compared across different WRZs. 
Unsurprisingly then, nearly all of the practitioners reported that there was a case for a more 
detailed exploration of risks in the guideline methodology (Box 2). Several participants 
suggested there was a need to extend the understanding of resilience and the consequences of 
system failure. Others argued that there was a need to better communicate the risks, costs and 
trade-offs in the plans. One participant reported that there was a need to recognise the value 
of investments that extend supply-demand surplus. Moreover, several participants added to 
the critique of existing DO assessment methodology by identifying some additional 
problems, including: a lack of any requirement to estimate likelihoods for a repeat of the 
drought of record or for a drought that would cause catastrophic failure; a failure to 
adequately expose the risk trade-offs between different interest groups; a lack of any 
requirement to understand and expose the “real consequences” of drought (e.g., would 
standpipes really be implemented at the lower storage triggers, or would a state of civil 
emergency generate sufficient political impetus to begin breaching environmental thresholds 
to uphold customer supplies?); and a failure to capture “robustness”—the capability of a 
system to uphold required performance standards under many alternative plausible futures. 
  
Box 2 
Is there a case for a more detailed exploration of risk for informing water resources 
planning decisions? 
Yes No Unsure 
Nearly all participants Very few Very few 
Yet despite all of the issues identified above, most of the participants argued that the existing 
process is imperfect but adequate; only a small minority saw any need for fundamental 
changes in the planning process. The identified weaknesses (resilience, subjectivity, 
inconsistency, etc.) were not widely regarded as a major impediment to effective planning 
within the current framework. The general line of thinking here was that DO assessment, 
despite its fallibilities, does not necessarily constrict a company from accommodating other 
sources of information in its plan; the overall process allows flexibility for important 
elements to be incorporated even if DO assessment fails to expose them. This view was 
typified by one participant’s claim that existing process is not “black and white”—it can 
accommodate political influence, the experience and knowledge of planners, or even 
additional analysis. One practitioner cited published planning appendices to demonstrate that 
certain companies had investigated resilience separately as part of their plans. On the issue of 
subjective margins, many participants emphasised that the aim of the prescribed planning 
process is not to attempt to define the “right” level of protection, but to define a baseline 
against which alternative options and scenarios can be tested. These practitioners argued that 
the primary function of the planning guideline is to provide transparent and consistent 
principles, minimum technical standards, an easily-understood basis for asking questions and 
a systematic, simple and repeatable method. Few saw any need for the baseline DO 
assessments to be comparable across the different water companies (although nearly all 
believed that a company should be able to cross-compare the water availability assessments 
across its own WRZs). The general feeling was that consistency of method and principles 
was much more important than comparability of the output metrics. 
Some participants also discussed ways in which to improve current practice without shifting 
away from DO assessment and capacity expansion planning. For example, a few participants 
suggested that the Emergency Storage margin could be removed and the underlying 
uncertainty brought into Headroom to remove some of the subjectivity and improve 
transparency. 
Effective communication 
Participants were asked what possible problems might arise from communicating risk in a 
simplistic way through the supply-demand balance (the question was primed with a statement 
noting that customers may assume that “surplus” indicates zero likelihood of failure, or that 
“deficit” indicates extreme risk). A few practitioners reported that stakeholders can be easily 
  
misled by the supply-demand balance—it “hides complexity,” “creates a blinkered view of 
what’s going on” and creates a false impression that “right level of risk is known.” One 
participant reported that politicians tend to get an oversimplified impression that a certain 
level of investment can eradicate risk, which fosters distrust in the industry if and when the 
fragility of a system is exposed by severe drought conditions. Another noted that the supply-
demand balance fails to present the cost-benefit trade-off. One participant suggested that term 
“surplus” might create a misleading impression that water that can be traded away without 
significant impact on risk. 
Interestingly, most practitioners spontaneously attempted to justify the need to communicate 
the state of a WRZ using a supply-demand balance. Many argued that the supply-demand 
balance is the only way to get an informed response from customers. The dominant belief 
was that companies need a simple and “clear” way of alerting customers to any issues, and 
that the best way to achieve this is with a pass/fail test and the term “deficit.” This 
perspective re-emerged at a number of different points during the interview. For example, 
when asked why classic design principles have persisted, a number of practitioners focused 
on the need for a clear pass/fail test, because “customers will tend to agree that a deficit needs 
to be addressed.” One practitioner captured the general sentiment by reporting that the 
supply-demand balance is more important as a communication tool than as a means to 
reaching decisions on where and how to invest in system improvements. Similarly, when 
asked about the overall purpose of the planning process, a number of participants focused on 
the value of prescribed guidance in terms of the legitimacy it creates for helping build the 
case for investment. They reported that the main purpose of the guideline is to expose risks, 
to identify and explicate the need for new resources and, ultimately, to “help companies 
invest to protect supplies for customers.” 
Prospects for risk-based planning 
It appears that an important advantage of DO assessment is its deterministic output, which 
helps planners communicate risk in simple terms. It should follow then that a method that 
produces complex metrics that are difficult to communicate would be deemed unattractive. 
Indeed, the interviews confirmed this supposition. Several participants reported that 
stakeholders would struggle to understand probabilistic performance metrics. Some feared 
that exposing difficult risk-cost trade-offs might open up non-productive debate on whether 
and how to invest. One participant used the term “paralysis by analysis” to describe this risk; 
another stated that investment based on probabilities would be a “hard sell.” One participant 
also warned that stochastic hydrology would cause confusion and emphasised the importance 
of using DO based on the drought of record, which provides clear assurance to customers that 
the system is designed against a real and tangible event. 
Several participants questioned the validity, rigor and worth of risk-based planning 
frameworks from a decision making perspective. For example, a third of participants 
indicated distrust in the plausibility of synthetic droughts generated by stochastic models and 
suggested that sensitivity analysis of the drought of record would be a more rigorous and 
  
appropriate way to examine risk and uncertainty. Some practitioners also identified potential 
problems with defining the “right level of risk” and others commented that companies would 
struggle to adequately monetise risks for project appraisal. A small number of participants 
challenged the idea that existing practice fails to accommodate risk—they argued that the 
Target Headroom percentile provides adequate scope for effective risk-cost trade-off. 
In contrast to these views, several practitioners reported that a risk-based planning framework 
would provide additional rigour and a stronger foundation for decision making, but that the 
industry lacks the time, resources and technical capacity to undertake the extensive modelling 
assessments that underpin this approach. Some practitioners also identified business and 
regulatory risks associated with overhauling the planning methodology. For example, certain 
companies might be uncomfortable informing stakeholders that the previous analysis was 
“wrong” in the event that a new form of analysis recommends a radically different course of 
action. A number of company planners indicated that regulators are resistant to major change 
because they have invested a lot in current approach, which is “tried and tested.” Some 
participants reported that the industry was collectively aware that existing practice is fallible, 
but that there has been a lack of demonstration of alternative approaches. 
Box 3 summarises the reasons why the water industry in England and Wales might resist a 
fundamental change in planning practice toward a risk-based approach. 
Box 3 Reasons for resistance to fundamental change toward a risk-based approach 
Too hard to communicate probabilistic metrics to stakeholders (most participants) 
Existing process is flexible enough to accommodate risk (several) 
Methods necessary to support a risk-based analysis lack rigour   (several) 
Methods necessary to support a risk-based analysis are too 
challenging, time consuming and/or expensive for companies to 
undertake 
(a few) 
A viable alternative to existing practice not yet demonstrated (a few) 
Planning process is less about finding the right level of risk than it 
is about providing a systematic basis for asking questions 
(a few) 
Planning process is less about finding the right level of risk than it 
is about legitimising decisions that might be reached via means 
other than technical assessments (e.g., planner experience, 
political influence) 
(a few) 
Change would risk confusing and losing the trust of stakeholders (very few) 
Too much invested in existing process to change (very few) 
  
Discussion 
The role of modelling assessments in planning 
The interviews exposed an interesting tension relating to the adequacy and effectiveness of 
DO assessment (and corresponding supply-demand balance) for communicating the state of a 
WRZ. To illustrate, no participant was able to provide a logical line of reasoning for the use 
of a specific margin of Emergency Storage; many even discussed how this feature has been 
buried in the analysis and forgotten about. Yet many of the participants also lauded the 
supply-demand balance on the basis of “clear communication” of the state of the WRZ. This 
raises an intriguing question: how can the measure of supply be deemed “clear” if it relies on 
such a significant level of “buried” subjectivity? And why did some participants report that 
the supply-demand balance provides a “clear” form of communication whilst others reported 
the exact opposite? One suspects the answer lies in the use language rather than in a 
divergence in opinion. “Clear” is probably the wrong word; a more accurate term might be 
“screened.” A deterministic measure of supply conceals complexity and thereby mitigates 
difficult questions. Few people would argue that “supply” should not meet demand or that a 
“deficit” should not be addressed, primarily because the information is presented in such a 
way that encourages the viewer to ignore the fact that “supply” is a complex and 
indeterministic concept. Conversely, there is plenty of scope for argument on whether a water 
company should aim for 75% or 95% certainty that it will maintain a restriction Level of 
Service of 1 in 20 years. Or should it aim for 95% certainty that the 1000-year drought will 
not cause catastrophic failure? Why not the 1 in 1500-year drought—and 98% certainty—just 
to be on the safe side? Would that be worth the £100 million investment? The scope for 
debate is endless, which is why one participant used the term “paralysis by analysis” to 
describe the risk of stifling a company’s ability to build consensus and legitimise a course of 
action. 
Indeed, most participants made a similar point in a less forthright way by suggesting that 
stakeholders would struggle to understand probabilistic performance metrics, or that 
presenting a supply-demand balance is the “only way to get an informed response.” This 
angle is slightly (and probably unintentionally) disingenuous because it assumes that 
stakeholders understand, and are adequately informed by, a supply-demand balance. The 
reality is that the only person that understands a supply-demand balance is the person who 
makes the underlying assumptions necessary to define supply in a deterministic way. Even if 
outsiders rigorously inspect the publically available planning documents they may still fail to 
gain such understanding, as several companies either fail to report on particular assumptions 
or withhold technical documents that outline those assumptions. The point is not to question 
or castigate the motives of planners, but simply to highlight the paradoxical nature of 
statements that emphasise the need for “clear” communication through a deterministic metric 
of supply. Taking these statements for what they really mean, the need to build consensus and 
generate an impetus for action through the modelling output is evidently important to a large 
section of the planning community. If a move away from deterministic planning prevents or 
  
hinders a company’s ability to invest in water resources infrastructure, then it also creates 
significant business and regulatory risk. Such risks have been largely ignored in the academic 
literature promoting fundamental change in the planning process and perhaps deserve more 
attention in future academic discussions on how to shape the planning process for WRMP19 
and beyond. 
Implications for existing practice 
It appears that effective decision making and effective project implementation can be 
conflicting objectives. On one hand, planners seek to use modelling assessments to develop a 
clear picture of risk and to understand how different options might address areas of concern. 
Nearly all of the participants agreed that there is a case for more detailed examination of risks 
in the planning guideline in order to help achieve those aims. On the other hand, a large 
section of the planning community appears reluctant to communicate the state of their WRZs 
in uncertain terms; the modelling assessment must legitimise action as well as inform it. The 
interview responses provide some insights to inform a discussion of the potential issues 
associated with accommodating these conflicting goals in a deterministic planning 
framework. 
The use of DO analysis and a supply-demand balance does not necessarily preclude more 
complex forms of decision making. On the contrary, many participants described additional 
components of decision making that can take place outside the DO assessment procedure. 
Knowledge of experienced practitioners, political considerations and separate analyses (e.g., 
vulnerability/resilience analysis) were cited as important sources of information that inform 
the ultimate investment decisions. Of course, accommodating these aspects will present a 
challenge in cases where perceived investment needs fail to match with the outputs of the 
prescribed modelling procedure. How will a company with a resilience problem, for instance, 
invest to deal with that issue if its WRZ is in a state of surplus? One can only assume that 
participants referring to the “flexibility” of existing practice meant that modelling 
assumptions can be adjusted in order to legitimise the desired course of action. This form of 
behaviour may seem illicit, but there are few alternatives for reconciling strict adherence to a 
modelling procedure for justifying decisions with the need to allow for important factors that 
cannot be easily captured through those modelling assessments. 
Several participants acknowledged this issue and reported that the prescribed process 
primarily aims to set a consistent basis for asking questions—that is, companies are not 
strictly bound by the least-cost capacity expansion ethos and may reasonably deviate from it 
by, for instance, favouring a set of options that do not necessarily resemble “least cost” for 
addressing a supply-demand balance but provide some other benefit (such as dealing with 
resilience). Challenging this view, one participant reported that companies that have faced 
public inquiry for their WRMPs had suffered extensive scrutiny focused specifically on the 
parts of their plans that deviated from the prescribed process. Moreover, there are other 
regulatory reporting requirements, such as the Security of Supply Index (SOSI), that derive 
from the supply-demand balance, so one cannot assume that companies would always be able 
  
to deviate from it without implications. So whilst in theory a company may be able to 
accommodate alternative aspects in the existing process in a clear and transparent way, in 
practice there are business risks associated with this approach. Regulators should perhaps 
consider that the current setup and the potentially conflicting objectives of decision-making 
and project justification may incentivise manipulation of modelling assumptions. 
There may be wider risks associated with the use of a supply-demand balance for 
communicating the state of a WRZ, particularly where those interpreting it are unaware of its 
limitations. Some participants considered this issue, envisioning potential problems where 
politicians get the wrong impression. For example, it is well acknowledged among the 
practitioner community that three consecutive dry winters is plausible hazard and a 
significant risk for southeast England. Yet faced with a supply-demand balance in a state of 
surplus, politicians may overlook this threat. Similarly, people outside the water resources 
planning community are unlikely to be aware that DO assessments cannot be fairly cross-
compared across different companies. For example, The UK Infrastructure Transitions 
Research Consortium recently published a national assessment of water security using 
aggregated DO data (UK ITRC, 2014). If a consortium of infrastructure planning experts 
based at the country’s most prestigious academic institutions failed to recognise what is 
concealed by the current planning metrics then what can be expected of Government policy 
makers and others viewing these assessments? As one participant noted, these issues of 
comparability could become increasingly important if and when companies begin to consider 
water trading. 
Limitations and future research needs 
The interview study captured the views of only fifteen practitioners. Moreover, the sample 
was confined to planners, consultants and regulators. Therefore the identified business risks 
may fail to adequately represent wider industry and company opinion. Company directors, for 
example, might have expressed a different set of views relating to the role of modelling 
assessments in building a consensus for action.  Moreover, since the prospect of stochastic 
modelling is nascent in England and Wales, the scope for detailed discussion on emerging 
planning methods was somewhat restricted. There was considerable variation in the 
participants’ level of understanding of what stochastic modelling assessments might achieve. 
The industry may offer a more balanced and considered perspective as the new methods find 
their way into UKWIR projects and national WRMP meeting agendas. A more detailed and 
expansive interview study would perhaps be of greater value in two or three years’ time as 
industry regulators begin to set down the WRMP guidelines for 2019. A broader range of 
scenario types, including examples featuring groundwater-only systems (of which there are 
many in England and Wales), would both enhance the robustness of the study and help widen 
its scope to better accommodate the views of a large and important section of the practitioner 
community. 
The interviews exposed a number of industry concerns relating to the practical and theoretical 
basis for a risk-based planning framework informed by stochastic modelling assessments. 
  
Some of the issues may be resolved through improved communication between the academic 
and practitioner communities. For example, the view that synthetic drought scenarios 
generated by stochastic models are implausible might be refuted by academics in this field. 
Those promoting the use of stochastic generators may therefore need to somehow clearly 
explain why their models produce credible information for use in water resources planning. 
The view that industry lacks the necessary software, data and models to undertake stochastic 
water resources modelling assessments could be challenged using industry studies reported in 
the academic literature (e.g., Harris et al., 2013; Asefa et al., 2014; Borgomeo et al., 2014; 
Turner et al., 2014) or through modelling trials conducted as part of upcoming UKWIR 
research. Further method development and case demonstration will be required to give 
practitioners greater confidence that a risk-based planning framework can provide 
information that is useful for making and justifying investment decisions. 
Conclusions 
1. The study found that most practitioners acknowledge a number of weaknesses in DO 
assessment methodology and believe there is a case for more detailed examination of risk 
in the planning process. However, few see a strong case for a fundamental shift toward a 
risk-based planning approach informed by stochastic modelling assessments. 
2. The study exposed a number of business risks associated with shifting away from 
conventional planning methods. Most importantly, several participants indicated that 
modelling assessments play an important role in building a consensus for action, which is 
more easily achieved when the state of a WRZ is presented deterministically using the 
supply-demand balance. 
3. The study found that many practitioners are sceptical about the practicality and utility of 
risk-based methods in water resources planning. Some hold reservations about the 
industry’s capacity for undertaking stochastic modelling assessments. Others distrust the 
outputs that emerge from such analyses or envisage difficulties in using the outputs to 
inform investment decisions. 
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